Cummins, Alstom, and the Long Tail of Hydrogen Mistakes

Cummins and Alstom have both faced significant setbacks in their hydrogen ventures, though their challenges differ fundamentally in nature and consequence. Cummins diversified its investments across multiple hydrogen technologies, including fuel cells and electrolyzers, only to confront a market reality where demand for hydrogen in energy applications lagged behind expectations, heavily reliant on subsidies and slow to develop. In contrast, Alstom committed to hydrogen trains with real-world contracts and operational fleets, creating long-term obligations to maintain and support these assets, which typically have service lives extending over several decades. This distinction means Cummins can more readily curtail losses and pivot, whereas Alstom is saddled with ongoing operational costs and support responsibilities that will persist despite the technology’s commercial struggles. Alstom’s acquisition of Cummins’ rail-focused hydrogen fuel cell activities in April 2026 underscores the company’s pragmatic approach to managing its existing hydrogen fleet rather than pursuing growth in the sector. The language surrounding the deal emphasises maintenance, reliability, and contractual fulfilment rather than expansion or innovation, signalling a shift from ambition to obligation. This reflects the broader context in which hydrogen rail has never been a straightforward alternative to diesel but has had to compete against well-established battery-electric and electrified rail options. Studies from Germany as early as 2020 highlighted the cost advantages of battery-electric trains over hydrogen, with some regions, such as Baden-Württemberg, deciding against hydrogen due to its significantly higher lifetime costs. Despite possessing battery-electric train technology and contracts since 2020, Alstom continued to promote hydrogen as part of its product portfolio, accumulating a fleet of hydrogen trains across Germany, Italy, and France. This strategic choice has resulted in a substantial installed base requiring specialised maintenance, spare parts, and fuel-cell support, which will impose ongoing financial and operational burdens. The operational experience in Lower Saxony and Frankfurt has reinforced the economic challenges of hydrogen trains, with delays, technical issues, and high running costs prompting authorities to favour battery and overhead electrification alternatives for future investments. These developments suggest that the difficulties faced by hydrogen rail are structural rather than merely managerial or technical. Cummins’ position in the hydrogen market is also shaped by its broader corporate profile as a major engine and power systems manufacturer. With the zero-emissions segment accounting for a mere 1.4% of its $33.7 billion revenue in 2025, the company’s hydrogen ambitions were always a relatively small part of its business. The disappointing market uptake has allowed Cummins to write down assets and scale back hydrogen activities without jeopardising its core operations. Meanwhile, Alstom’s entanglement with hydrogen rail highlights the risks of committing heavily to emerging technologies before market conditions and cost structures have matured. Both cases illustrate the complexities and long-term implications of strategic bets on hydrogen in the transport sector, signalling caution for other players considering similar investments.